Inaugurating coolidge, p.8
Inaugurating Coolidge, page 8
The next day, President Wilson headed east to continue drumming up support for the League. Just a few days later, after speaking poignantly in favor of the League in Pueblo, Colorado, the president developed a constant headache. His facial muscles twitched uncontrollably, and with severe nausea, he collapsed. His staff quickly canceled the rest of the tour, and the train rushed east to get him home to the White House.14
On October 2, 1919, a few days after arriving back in Washington, First Lady Edith Wilson heard a thud from the presidential bathroom in the private residence of the White House. She rushed inside and found her husband collapsed in a heap on the floor. She ran down the hall to a private phone, called down to Chief Usher Ike Hoover’s office, and told him to “please get Dr. Grayson, the President is very sick.”15
Grayson, Mrs. Wilson, and Hoover struggled to lift the president onto his bed. Once there, Grayson examined him and quickly proclaimed that Wilson was paralyzed. Mrs. Wilson declared the presidential bedroom off limits to staff, excepting Ike Hoover; Joseph Tumulty, the president’s secretary; and medical personnel. Any business meant for the president, Mrs. Wilson stated, would go through her.16
Within a few days, rumors had begun to spread that Wilson had suffered a severe stroke. It paralyzed his left side, diminished his vision, restricted his speech, and impaired his judgment. To Ike Hoover, Wilson “looked as if he were dead.”17
Robert Lansing, Wilson’s secretary of state, had decided to resign from that position just a few days before the president fell ill in September. Born in Watertown, New York, in 1864, Lansing became a prominent international lawyer, and President Wilson appointed him a special counselor to the State Department as war with Germany grew into a reality. Upon the 1915 resignation of William Jennings Bryan as secretary of state, Wilson appointed Lansing to that position.18
Just as he had done with Republican Senate leaders, Wilson completely ignored Lansing during the peace negotiations in Paris, not least in part because Lansing opposed much of the Versailles Treaty, including Wilson’s love child, the League of Nations. Unlike Bryan, a three-time losing Democratic nominee for the presidency, Lansing did not have a political base. This allowed Wilson to act as his own secretary of state throughout the rest of his presidency. Wilson told one of his top aides that “Lansing would not be troublesome by obtruding or injecting his own views.”19
On October 2, 1919, Secretary of State Lansing phoned Dr. Grayson to ask if the president could receive the king and queen of Belgium. Grayson told Lansing that Wilson could not and that his condition was “bad.”20 With the complete lack of details coming from the president’s sickroom, Lansing deduced that Wilson had suffered an event that had left him incapacitated and unable to continue as president.
Presidential secretary Joseph Tumulty began his political career in New Jersey as a member of that state’s general assembly. He quickly became an adviser to Woodrow Wilson when the latter ran for governor of New Jersey. After his successful election to that office, Wilson named Tumulty as his private secretary. Tumulty adored Woodrow Wilson and his loyalty grew with each year he served. He did not have a good relationship with the First Lady, as she wanted him removed from the White House due mainly to his Catholic beliefs. Tumulty offered his resignation, but Wilson kept him on.21
Several days after the president’s stroke, Secretary Lansing summoned Tumulty to the Cabinet Room in the White House for a private interview. Lansing was under no illusions as to the health of president. He knew Wilson would not be able to execute the office of president of the United States for some time. When Tumulty entered and sat, Lansing read to him part of Section 1, Article 2, of the United States Constitution: “In case of the removal of the President from office, or his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve upon the Vice-President.”22
In 1919, the Constitution did not go any further than that on the matter of presidential disability. It did not give any clue, or indication, as to the individuals who would certify such a momentous circumstance. Certainly the vice president could not do it, as that would open him to attacks as being a usurper to the highest office. Perhaps a majority of the cabinet could agree that the president was incapacitated, but they had no formal indication from any medical personnel that the president could not function. Barring a doctor’s opinion that a disability existed, or that the president himself had asked the vice president to assume his duties, there would be no way to remove Woodrow Wilson from office, no matter how sick he became.
Lansing confessed to Tumulty that he thought the time had arrived for the vice president to take over the powers and duties of the presidential office. Inflamed at the flagrant disloyalty of Lansing toward President Wilson, Tumulty replied angrily, “Mr. Lansing, the Constitution is not a dead letter with the White House. I have read the Constitution and do not find myself in need of any tutoring at your hands of the provision you have just read.”23 He asked the secretary of state who he felt should certify the disability of the president.
Lansing responded he felt it would be best to come from Tumulty and Dr. Grayson.24
“You may rest assured,” Tumulty responded, almost banging his fist on the table, “that while Woodrow Wilson is lying in the White House on the broad of his back I will not be a party to ousting him. He has been too kind, too loyal, and too wonderful to me to receive such treatment at my hands.”25
Just after Tumulty had given his angry response, Dr. Grayson entered the Cabinet Room. “I am sure,” Tumulty said, looking at Grayson, “that Doctor Grayson will never certify to his disability. Will you, Grayson?”26
Tumulty wrote in his memoirs a few years later, “Doctor Grayson left no doubt in Mr. Lansing’s mind that he would not do as Mr. Lansing suggested. I then notified Mr. Lansing that if anybody outside of the White House circle attempted to certify to the President’s disability, that Grayson and I would stand together and repudiate it. I added that if the President were in a condition to know of this episode he would, in my opinion, take decisive measures.”27 With that, Tumulty and Grayson retreated from the Cabinet Room, leaving Lansing to wonder who was actually running the country.
Frustrated with the lack of details of the president’s condition, on October 6, 1919, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, without authorization from President Wilson, called a cabinet meeting to discuss Wilson’s health and whether the vice president should become assume the powers and duties of the presidency. Lansing discussed Wilson’s health, then asked aloud whether Wilson was disabled. He also reminded the cabinet that the Constitution did not explain who had the authority in proclaiming a presidential disability.28 Lansing summoned Dr. Grayson for an update on Wilson’s health.
Grayson entered the Cabinet Room and explained that “Wilson’s mind was clear but that he must be spared all official business for the time being.”29 The doctor mentioned nothing about a stroke. Grayson then stared straight at Lansing. “The President asked me what the cabinet wanted with me and by what authority it was meeting while he was in Washington without a call from him.”30 Grayson’s remarks shocked Lansing. Before he could answer, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker stepped in and explained to Grayson they were meeting as “as a mark of affection,” and to assure the president they “were all looking out for his interests.”31
The man who would become acting president prayed fervently he would not have to assume presidential duties. Thomas R. Marshall, an attorney and former governor of Indiana, had been on the national scene for just over a decade. His choice by the Democrats as Wilson’s running mate in 1912 was a geopolitical decision; the swing state of Indiana would balance out the Democratic national ticket. A short, thin man with a mustache so thick a bird could nest there, he remained popular with the folks in Indiana and increased that popularity with the rest of America, even though the office he now held was considered unimportant.
The Founding Fathers created the vice presidency almost as an afterthought, an inconsequential decision. Roger Sherman of Connecticut stated during the Constitutional Convention, “If the vice-President were not to be President of the Senate, he would be without employment.”32 The only other role created for the vice president depended solely on the president’s health and behavior. The Constitution read that “In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President.”33 The Founding Fathers held the vice presidency in such contempt that they did not even want him to assume the office of the president, but merely to assume the power and duties and become an acting president.
The first vice president, John Adams, wrote his wife regarding the vice presidency: “In this I am nothing, But I may be everything.”34 Theodore Roosevelt said of the vice presidency, before he held the office, that “the position is not a steppingstone to anything except oblivion.” On another occasion, Roosevelt confessed, “I would a great deal rather be anything, say professor of history, than Vice-President.”35 Thomas R. Marshall, in his homespun best, explained the office perfectly—“Once there were two brothers. One ran away to sea; the other was elected vice president of the United States. And nothing was heard of either of them again.”36
The constitutional framework regarding the vice presidency held for the first 50 years of the American republic. In 1841, however, President William Henry Harrison died in office, and for the first time in American history, a vice president would put the Constitution to the test. Vice President John Tyler assumed not only the powers and duties inherent to the presidency, but also the presidential office itself. Since the Constitution created some confusion as to the duties of the vice president once the president died, some in Congress balked at Tyler’s ascension to the presidential office, but Tyler ignored them. When Harrison’s cabinet told Tyler that the dead president let the cabinet decide major policy decisions by vote, Tyler replied he was now the president. “I, as president, shall be responsible for my administration.”37 He further explained that if they could not respect this decision, he would accept their resignations.38
Thus, the precedent of vice-presidential succession to the office of the president was established and continued throughout the history of the United States, though the Constitution still remained vague and by Wilson’s time had not been established by law.
Presidential disability was another matter, completely different than a presidential death, and Thomas Marshall knew it. He felt the pressure to assume the powers and duties of the presidency but decided that unless invited by Wilson or the First Lady to do so, it would be a usurpation of power and that there would be two presidents.
In his article, “Vice-presidential behavior in a disability crisis: The case of Thomas R. Marshall,” Joel K. Goldstein discussed the dilemma faced by vice presidents confronted with a succession crisis. When succeeding to the presidency upon the death of the president, “No Vice President facing a succession crisis can seem to welcome his political advance through the president’s grave misfortune. In any such situation, a Vice President must show appropriate restraint and credible regret.”39
However, a presidential disability is completely different because the president is still alive. Goldstein continued,
Unless the President voluntary transfers power to the Vice President, the latter may need to act to claim it. Yet, that imperative raises the possibility that the Vice President will act, or be perceived to act, in an ambitious and self-interested manner. That contingency makes the Vice President vulnerable to the character critiques that he placed personal gain over decency and loyalty, and acted as a judge in a matter in which he was involved.40
Marshall had practiced presidential leadership almost a year before when Wilson sailed for Europe to negotiate peace between the Allies and their enemies. Arguments had been made by those in Congress that such a lengthy trip, with slow methods of communication between such distances, could constitute an inability of President Wilson to discharge the powers and duties of the office. While the argument was rebuffed, Wilson felt he needed to invite Vice President Marshall to preside over the cabinet in his absence. Six days after Wilson’s departure, Marshall held his first cabinet meeting, at which he read a statement. Sensitive to any accusation that he aspired to the presidency, Marshall said,
In assuming the Chair and presiding over what is known as a meeting of the cabinet, I deem it proper to make a brief statement so that my conduct may not be misunderstood nor misinterpreted. I am here and am acting in obedience to a request preferred by the President upon the eve of his departure and also at your request. But I am here informally and personally. I am not undertaking to exercise any official duty or function. I shall preside in an unofficial and informal way over your meetings out of deference to your desires and those of the President.41
Days after Wilson’s stroke, Marshall still had not been informed of his real condition even though some in the cabinet knew, or at least deduced, the seriousness of his illness. Marshall reportedly tried to see President Wilson on two occasions. Both times, Mrs. Wilson rebuffed him. Wilson’s coconspirators in his medical cover-up did not want to discuss the president’s health in any official way. They felt that such communication could start rumors that a presidential transfer would take place and by inference would suggest Wilson was deathly ill. Someone in that inner circle, however, suggested that it would be appropriate for someone to unofficially brief Vice President Marshall on Wilson’s real condition.
The cabal finally decided that J. Fred Essary, a friendly Washington reporter for the Baltimore Sun, could be entrusted with the real scope of the president’s health. Essary traveled to Marshall’s office and explained to him the true extent of Wilson’s illness. Marshall sat in stunned silence as he realized exactly how close he stood to becoming president. Essary reported to Wilson’s little group that “Marshall sat speechless, staring at his clasped hands. Essary awaited some reaction but received none. He rose, approached the door, and looked back at the amiable little man from a small town in Indiana, still gazing at his hands.”42
With little public outcry that a transfer of power should take place and no congressional resolution or desire from the Wilsons to have it take place, Marshall chose not to call for Wilson to cede the powers and duties of the presidency to him. Marshall confided to his wife that “he would not throw this country into a civil war.” According to a Marshall aide who “encouraged him to prepare to assume the presidency,” Marshall said he would “not seize the place” and risk having a recovered Wilson accuse him of usurpation.43
As 1919 waned and 1920 dawned, Wilson slowly started to regain his health, although he would never physically equal the man or president he had once been. During his illness, the Senate rejected the League of Nations, partly due to Wilson’s obstinance and refusal to accept the Lodge reservations. Wilson fired Secretary of State Lansing for calling the cabinet together while Wilson resided in the White House, and the president held his first cabinet meeting in almost six months in April 1920.
Undoubtedly, Wilson’s illness impacted his ability to effectively govern the nation. The small group, led by Mrs. Wilson, succeeded in keeping the worst about the president’s health from Congress and the American people. Ike Hoover summed up the last 17 months of the Wilson administration, writing that Wilson “was sicker than the world ever knew … he was unreasonable, unnatural, simply impossible. His suspicions intensified; his perspective distorted … there was never a moment during all that time when [Wilson]was more than a shadow of his former self. He had changed from a giant to a pygmy in every wise.”44
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1. Gregory Aydt, “The Treaty of Versailles in the Senate,” Historia, Volume 6, 1997, 51.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 52.
4. Herbert Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1958), 266.
5. Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925), 184.
6. “The League’s Debaters,” New York-Tribune, March 23, 1919.
7. A. Scott Berg, Wilson (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2013), 619.
8. “President is Greeted With Storm of Cheers,” The Los Angeles Times, September 21, 1919.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. “Long Beach People Hear Statesmanlike Appeal on Behalf of Covenant,” Press-Telegram, September 22, 1919.
12. “Partisanship is Eliminated,” The Los Angeles Times, September 21, 1919.
13. “Wilson’s Auditorium Address,” The Los Angeles Times, September 21, 1919.
14. Berg, Wilson, 635.
15. Ibid., 640.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 641.
18. David Glaser, Robert Lansing: A Study in Statecraft (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2015), Kindle, Location 256.
19. Ibid., Location 298.
20. Ibid., Location 1492.
21. Katherine Schrett, “Edith Bolling Wilson, a Model of the Modern Independent Working Woman,” digital exhibit, Woodrow Wilson House, accessed May 8, 2022, https://www.woodrowwilsonhouse.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/EBW-DIGITAL-EXHIBIT-Text-MAY2021-katherineS.pdf
22. United States Constitution, Section I, Article 2.
23. Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, 1921), 443.
